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executive summary
In the aftermath of the euro crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) took over responsibilities 
for banking supervision in the euro area in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). This expansion of the original ECB mandate in monetary policy was coupled with the es-
tablishment of additional accountability mechanisms to balance the newly acquired competenc-
es. In terms of political accountability, the relationship with the European Parliament (EP) was 
placed front and centre — with regular interactions between the two institutions since late 2013. 
This paper analyses the accountability interactions between the EP’s Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (ECON) Committee and ECB Banking Supervision in the first 4.5 years of the function-
ing of the SSM. In particular, it aims to: 1) situate the relationship between the ECB and the EP 
in the broader context of political accountability in banking supervision; 2) provide an overview 
of the frequency and patterns of interactions between the two institutions, describing types 
of questions asked and answers provided; and 3) identify strengths and weaknesses in the 
process, with a forward-looking focus on prospects for improvement.
Key takeaways:
1.  The track record of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in holding the 
ECB to account is rather poor: too often their questions simply request policy views 
or address issues outside the competence of the ECB in banking supervision. 
Moreover, the format of public hearings does not facilitate a coordinated agenda of 
questions and follow-ups, organised by topic and raised in sequence.
2.  The ECB shows openness to address requests for information and justification of 
conduct when it comes to the internal organisation of the SSM and the general 
decision-making process. In the few cases where MEPs demanded changes in su-
pervisory policy, the ECB demonstrated its willingness to take their requests into 
consideration and act accordingly.
1. The research behind this policy paper was conducted within the framework of the LEVIATHAN project ’Legal and Political Account-
ability in ‘Post-Crisis’ EU Economic Governance’ (2017–2021), led by Professor Mark Dawson and hosted at the Hertie School of 
Governance in Berlin, Germany. The project is funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme (grant agreement no 716923). Adina Maricut-Akbik is Postdoctoral Researcher on the LEVIATHAN 
project. Contact: maricut-akbik@hertie-school.org. 
3.  However, there is a tension between the subject of questions raised most often — re-
garding the situation at specific banks — and the professional secrecy requirements 
of the SSM legal framework, which keep individual supervisory decisions confiden-
tial. Consequently, the performance of the ECB as a bank supervisor is rarely ques-
tioned, although some MEPs are eager to contest supervisory conduct.
4.  The accountability relationship between the two institutions can be improved in 
several ways. For its part, the EP needs to alter the format of public hearings so as 
to streamline the process of addressing questions and consolidate in-house exper-
tise on various aspects of the Banking Union. ECB Banking Supervision should de-
vote more time to explaining how it answers questions from MEPs and how its role 
differs from other institutions in the Banking Union. Moreover, the accountability 
relationship could benefit from clear benchmarks to assess the ECB’s performance 
as a bank supervisor. Finally, reform of the confidentiality regime should also be 
considered in order to identify specific circumstances where previous supervisory 
decisions could be disclosed, for the benefit of the public at large.
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backgroUNd
In November 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) became responsible for banking supervi-
sion in the euro area in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM 
was one of the key institutional reforms adopted at the European level in response to the euro 
crisis. Its rationale was twofold: a) pre-crisis banking supervision at the national level in Mem-
ber States was often seen as too lenient, and b) a European system of banking supervision 
was portrayed as the necessary counterpart to the potential direct recapitalisation of banks 
through the European Stability Mechanism,2 although the latter never materialised. In June 
2012, Member States agreed in principle to delegate the microprudential supervision of banks 
in the euro area to the ECB. This political commitment was then translated into legislation 
through the SSM Regulation, adopted in 2013.
The SSM Regulation specifies the ECB’s supervisory objective, namely ‘the safety and sound-
ness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and each 
Member State’ (Article 1). It thus makes clear that the ECB is supposed to conduct prudential 
supervision as opposed to other functions such as consumer protection or the prosecution 
of financial crimes. Consistent supervision and financial integration are also cited among 
the main goals of the SSM. So far, the ECB has not provided measurable indicators for each 
objective, as it did in monetary policy with the inflation target. Nevertheless, the first Chair of 
the Supervisory Board, Danièle Nouy, often refers in speeches to the need to act as a ‘tough 
and fair’ bank supervisor.3 
To balance the expansion of ECB powers in banking supervision, separate accountability ob-
ligations were put in place at the political, legal, and administrative levels, hence adding to the 
already existing accountability toolbox on the monetary policy side of the ECB. In terms of 
political accountability, the relationship with the European Parliament (EP) became central — in 
a similar way to the already established Monetary Dialogue. Unlike in monetary policy, ECB 
Banking Supervision has additional political accountability obligations towards the Eurogroup 
and national parliaments (Articles 20–21 of the SSM Regulation). However, interactions with 
the Eurogroup are confidential, while visits to national parliaments take place on an ad hoc 
basis, so it is very difficult to assess their functioning in a systematic manner. In contrast, EP 
hearings with the Chair of the Supervisory Board and the exchange of documents between the 
two institutions are public and occur regularly.
The accountability obligations of ECB Banking Supervision towards the EP are detailed in a 
first-time Interinstitutional Agreement between the two institutions, signed in 2013. In line 
with the SSM Regulation, this requires:
2. Euro Area Summit Statement 29 June 2012, accessed 5 July 2018. 
3. Danièle Nouy, The Banking Union, One Year On (Speech at the Center for European Reform, London, 21 October 2015),  
accessed 29 June 2018. 
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•  the publication of an annual report on the execution of tasks conferred by the SSM 
Regulation;
•  participation of the Chair of the Supervisory Board in ordinary and ad hoc public 
hearings at the EP’s Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee and, upon 
request, in confidential meetings with Members of the Committee;
•  responding in writing and within five weeks to written questions on the SSM put by 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs);
•  the transmission of confidential, annotated Records of Proceedings of the Supervi-
sory Board that allow ECON Members to understand the substance of the discus-
sions and decisions taken (Articles 1–4).
Against this background, the present paper sets out to investigate how the EP holds the 
ECB to account in banking supervision. The goal is to evaluate the patterns of accountability 
interactions between the ECB and its main political interlocutor in banking supervision — the 
EP’s ECON Committee. To achieve this goal, the paper focuses on the type of questions and 
answers exchanged by the two institutions in both written letters and public hearings.
The analysis is based on 283 letters and 13 public hearings that took place at the ECON Com-
mittee from October 2013 (since the adoption of the SSM Regulation) until April 2018. All doc-
uments are publicly available on the websites of ECB Banking Supervision and of the EP (under 
‘ECON Committee meetings’ and MEPs’ ‘parliamentary activities’). A total of 1,412 questions 
and answers have been identified and categorised using the qualitative research software At-
las.ti. Before presenting its findings, the paper provides an overview of the key issues at stake 
in the accountability relationship between the EP and ECB Banking Supervision.
1 ▪ PoliTical accoUNTabiliTy iN baNkiNg 
SUPerviSioN: key iSSUeS
The accountability interactions between the ECB and the EP in banking supervision can be 
placed in the broader context of executive-legislative relations, specifically the extent to which 
a specialised independent agency can be held accountable by a parliamentary body. In the 
academic literature, a common definition of accountability describes the term as ‘the relation-
ship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to jus-
tify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may 
face consequences.’4 According to the Interinstitutional Agreement between the ECB and the 
EP, the actor (i.e. the ECB) has to share information on a regular basis and justify its conduct 
through annual reports and the transmission of confidential records of proceedings, while the 
forum (i.e. the EP) can ask questions in public hearings, confidential meetings, as well as in 
writing. The potential for formal consequences is more limited: the EP must approve the ap-
pointment of the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, and it may set up ‘Committees 
of Inquiry’ in which the ECB has to ‘cooperate sincerely.’ 
4. Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual framework (2007) 13 European Law Journal 447, 450. 
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The EP’s powers as an accountability forum are restricted by the general independence of 
the ECB as well as by the legal framework of the SSM. On the one hand, ECB independence 
severely limits the EP’s influence on ECB decision-making: both the Treaty (Article 130 
TFEU) and the SSM Regulation (Article 19) prohibit the ECB from taking instructions from 
other Union institutions. This means that any recommendations made by the EP in its An-
nual Reports on the Banking Union are not legally binding; they allow the EP ‘to pass judg-
ment’ on the conduct of the ECB without formal consequences. On the other hand, the EP on 
its own cannot change the legal framework in which the ECB operates as a bank supervisor. 
The SSM Regulation is a Council Regulation adopted through a special legislative procedure 
on which the EP was only consulted. Even if it wanted to, the EP does not have the power to 
unilaterally sanction the past conduct of ECB Banking Supervision through a change in the 
legal framework. 
Furthermore, the accountability challenges faced by the two institutions are characteristic of 
relationships between parliaments and specialised independent agencies. Most significantly, 
there are problems of 1) asymmetric information, as the ECB is an expert body possessing 
much more knowledge in the field of banking supervision than the EP, and 2) hidden action, giv-
en that ECB supervisory decisions remain unseen by MEPs.5 Banking supervision is a highly 
technical area that requires financial, legal and accounting expertise; moreover, there are 
strict confidentiality requirements that prevent the disclosure of sensitive supervisory data 
and decisions. However, the risk of ‘agency drift’ — the independent agency diverging from 
its mandate — is not the same as in monetary policy. The difference lies not only in selection 
procedures, as the EP can veto the appointment of the Chair of the Supervisory Board while 
unable to do the same for Members of the ECB Executive Board,6 but also in the nature of the 
mandate itself. In monetary policy, the ECB is free to decide and implement its preferred policy 
instruments within the confines of the Treaty (especially Articles 119 and 123 TFEU), where-
as in banking supervision it has to apply secondary law.7 In fact, banking supervision leaves 
limited room for discretion in comparison to monetary policy. The SSM legal framework is 
elaborate, based on international regulatory standards (Basel III) translated into EU legislation 
through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR). This means that ECB Banking Supervision is responsible for enforcing tangible legal 
rules which are subject to change by the co-legislators, i.e. the EP and the Council. In other 
words, there is much more room for checking whether the ECB complies with the rules frame-
work in the SSM than in monetary policy.
In terms of substance, the most contentious accountability issue in banking supervision 
concerns the transparency of supervisory decisions and bank-level information. Here there 
is a huge gap between American and European practices regarding the disclosure of finan-
cial supervisory data, with the latter traditionally more inclined towards confidentiality.8 The 
reasons for secrecy concern legalities, trust between the supervisor and the supervisee, and 
financial stability at large. Legally, EU bank supervisors are not allowed to disclose information 
5. Kaare Strøm, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (2000) 37 European Journal of Political Research 261, 270. 
6. Diane fromage and Renato Ibrido, The “Banking Dialogue” as a Model to Improve Parliamentary Involvement in the Monetary 
Dialogue? (2018) 40 Journal of European Integration 295, 296. 
7. Gijsbert Ter Kuile, Laura wissink and willem Bovenschen, Tailor-Made Accountability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 155, 167–68. 
8. Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg, Explaining Variation and Change in Supervisory Confidentiality in the European Union 
(2018) 41 west European Politics 1025, 1029. 
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that would endanger the competitive position of a credit institution on the market.9 In relation 
to trust, banks are more likely to share sensitive information with the supervisor if they are 
confident that this will be treated confidentially. From the perspective of financial stability, 
liquidity problems at a bank can trigger bank runs and panic in the population.10 Conversely, 
the arguments for transparency are more general: transparency is a precondition for account-
ability which increases the legitimacy of the supervisors by allowing accountability forums to 
judge whether the supervisor is acting in the public interest. Moreover, transparency reduces 
the scope for arbitrary decisions and creates stable expectations that incentivise banks to 
adhere to regulations.11
In the Interinstitutional Agreement with the ECB, the EP consented to balance account-
ability obligations with secrecy requirements (Article 5). Accordingly, MEPs can read a 
non-confidential version of Records of the Proceedings of the Supervisory Board, which are 
summaries of discussions after each meeting. In addition, there are confidential ‘in-camera 
meetings’ that take place before hearings of the Chair of the Supervisory Board at the ECON 
Committee. These are meetings between the coordinators of all political groups, the ECON 
Chair and Vice-Chairs, and the Chair of the Supervisory Board to organise the agenda of 
public hearings.12 These encounters are reported to be much more confrontational than 
public hearings, with a ‘tough’ language that is often absent in public interactions between 
the two institutions.13 But the downside of confidential accountability is the suspicion 
that there is something to hide; after all, how can the public be sure that the ECB is being 
held accountable behind closed doors? The same problem is found in the accountability 
interactions between ECB Banking Supervision and the Council: formally, the provisions of 
the Interinstitutional Agreement are mirrored in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 
2013 between the ECB and the Council — specifically concerning the Eurogroup. However, 
exchanges of views and questions from national finance ministers remain confidential, in 
line with Eurogroup practices.14 It is thus impossible to evaluate their accountability rela-
tionship other than to say that the Chair of the Supervisory Board participates in Eurogroup 
meetings at least twice per year, when they appear to discuss the same topics as in hearings 
at the ECON Committee.15
Two final issues further complicate the scope for political accountability of ECB Banking Su-
pervision. On the one hand, the SSM is part of a Banking Union that is still work-in-progress. 
Several legislative dossiers for amending or completing the Banking Union are currently under 
9. Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation 
(market abuse). 
10. Ignazio Angeloni, Transparency and Banking Supervision (Remarks by Ignazio Angeloni, Member of the Supervisory Board of the 
European Central Bank at the ICMA Capital Market Lecture Series, frankfurt am Main, 27 January, 2015), accessed 19 October 2018. 
11. franka Liedorp and others, Transparency of Banking Supervisors (2013) 61 IMf Economic Review 310, 311. 
12. ECON Committee Chair Roberto Gualtieri sometimes refers to ‘meetings at the coordinators’ level’ in his announcements at the 
beginning of public hearings (Regular Hearing with Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, on 9 November 2017), 
accessed 23 October 2018. 
13. Information about ECON in-camera meetings was shared during the closed workshop Contesting the Incontestable: The ‘Post- 
Crisis’ Accountability of the European Central Bank held on 8 October 2018 at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany. 
According to Chatham House Rules, the identity or affiliation of the speakers cannot be revealed, unless the participants explicitly 
consented to be cited anonymously (see n 19 and 29).
14. Uwe Puetter, The Eurogroup: How a Secretive Circle of finance Ministers Shape European Economic Governance (Manchester 
University Press 2006). 
15. See statements following Eurogroup meetings, Council of the European Union, Eurogroup - Consilium, accessed 23 October 2018. 
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review, which means that the framework of rules in which the ECB operates remains in flux.16 
On the other hand, the Banking Union is a complex arrangement spread over several institu-
tions: the European Banking Authority (in charge of banking regulation), the ECB (responsible 
for banking supervision), and the Single Resolution Board/the Commission (in charge of bank-
ing resolution). In addition, the ECB is part of a layered supervisory system in which it acts in 
coordination with domestic supervisors, known as National Competent Authorities (NCAs). 
This means that the ECB functions in a changing environment where the division of compe-
tences is difficult to disentangle. Holding the ECB accountable as a bank supervisor is thus far 
from straightforward. 
2 ▪ How oFTeN do mePS aNd ecb baNkiNg 
SUPerviSioN iNTeracT?
The SSM Regulation was adopted in October 2013, giving the ECB one year to prepare for 
taking over banking supervision in the euro area. The dialogue with the ECON Committee 
started right away, while the first Chair of the Supervisory Board Danièle Nouy took office 
in January 2014. During the period October 2013–April 2018, the EP asked ECB Banking 
Supervision a total of 706 single-topic questions in both written letters and public hear-
ings. Box 1 offers an overview of the letters exchanged between the two institutions in the 
56 months analysed. Overall, ECB Banking Supervision used 123 documents to answer 
150 letters sent by MEPs. There are two reasons why the number of letters sent by MEPs 
does not correspond to the number of letters published by the ECB. First, letters sent at the 
end of the calendar year are answered early in the new year, so there is never an equivalence 
between the numbers of documents exchanged per year. Second, the ECB has a practice of 
using one document to answer multiple letters sent by same MEP(s). This is not to say that 
each single-topic question goes unanswered, but that one document can contain multiple 
answers. Besides, seven ECB letters simply followed up on questions raised during hear-
ings at the ECON Committee. In addition, three documents included both questions and 
answers addressed by Members of the ECON Committee to ECB President Mario Draghi 
before the appointment of the first Chair of the Supervisory Board. In total, MEPs raised 337 
single-topic questions in written letters. 
16. Council of the European Union, Amendments to the Banking Union Rules - Consilium (May 2018), accessed 22 October 2018. 
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box 1 ▪ letters with written questions and answers exchanged between the eP and ecb banking Supervision 
(october 2013–april 2018)
Furthermore, there have been 13 public hearings of ECB Banking Supervision at the ECON 
Committee during the period January 2014–April 2018, after the first Chair of the Supervi-
sory Board was appointed. Box 2 provides an overview of the type of hearings taking place in 
the period under focus. Ordinary hearings as well as hearings on the SSM annual report make 
the bulk of the data. In terms of format, hearings usually last between 90 and 120 minutes and 
follow a specific structure, starting with 1) welcome announcements by the ECON Chair, fol-
lowed by 2) an introductory statement by the Chair of the Supervisory Board, and then moving 
to 3) questions and answers (Q&A) from MEPs. In line with the EP’s Internal Rules of Proce-
dure, speaking time is allocated in order of the size of political groups and in proportion to their 
total number of members (Rule 162 for the 8th parliamentary term). On average, MEPs ask 
28 questions during a Q&A session of a public hearing, bringing the total to 369 questions 
in the period under consideration.
box 2 ▪ Public hearings of ecb banking Supervision at the eP’s ecoN committee (January 2014–april 2018) 
THE EP ASKS MANY  
qUESTIONS TO ECB 
BANKING SUPERVISION 
BOTH IN wRITING  
AND IN HEARINGS
“
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Having established the number of questions raised by the EP to ECB Banking Supervision, the 
next relevant aspect concerns the profile of MEPs who ask questions (Box 3). In terms of let-
ters, the majority is sent by individual or groups of MEPs from the ECON Committee, although 
there were 4 questionnaires sent by the ECON Chair on behalf of the entire committee and one 
letter sent by the EP’s President. In respect to political groups (Figure 1), most letters are sent 
by MEPs from GUE-NGL (24.1%), the Greens/EFA (16.8%), and the EPP (15.5%). In terms of 
nationality (Figure 3), most letters are authored by Members from Portugal (22.7%), Germany 
(20.9%), Italy (17.7%) and Spain (16.4%). The national affiliation of MEPs matters more for 
some members than others: for instance, MEPs from Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Greece 
tend to ask questions regarding their own Member State. The others ask more general ques-
tions that go beyond their national context, although of course they also inquire about specific 
situations at their national/regional levels. 
When it comes to public hearings, the breakdown of MEPs asking questions by political group 
and nationality looks different. One the one hand, the EP’s Rules of Procedure automatically 
incline the balance towards larger groups (see Figure 2). Accordingly, MEPs from the two larg-
est political groups in the 8th parliamentary term — the EPP and the S&D — took the floor most 
often (each 28.8% of the time). They were followed by MEPs from the ECR and the Greens/
EFA (each 7.7% of the time). The limited speaking time of small groups during public hearings 
is likely to contribute to a higher number of written questions from their members (Figure 1). 
However, the ideological position of MEPs definitely plays a role, as the two most active po-
litical groups in written letters — GUE-NGL and the Greens/EFA — are on the left of the politi-
cal spectrum. On the other hand, in respect to nationality (Figure 4), German MEPs are leading 
in public hearings (speaking 23.1% of the time), followed by MEPs from France (12.8%), and 
Italy and Spain (12.2% each). What is counted here is the number of instances an MEP takes 
the floor rather than the number of questions they ask at a time.
List of political groups in the 8th parliamentary term 2014–2019 (in order of size):
•  Group of the European People’s Party (EPP)
•  Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European 
Parliament (S&D)
•  European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR)
•  Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
•  The Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) 
•  Confederal Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL)
•  Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD)
•  Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)
THE PROfILE Of MEPS 
wHO RAISE qUESTIONS  
IS VERY DIVERSE“
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box 3 ▪ who asks questions to ecb banking Supervision? (october 2013–april 2018) 
3 ▪ wHaT TyPeS oF qUeSTioNS do mePS aSk? 
The SSM Regulation does not provide a definition of ECB accountability in banking supervision. The 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the ECB and the EP lists several accountability obligations 
but similarly does not specify what it means to be an accountable bank supervisor. By implication, 
one can infer that if the ECB complies with regular reporting requirements to the EP, then it is ac-
countable. But there is a difference between formally answering questions and substantively 
addressing the concerns they raise. To categorise the types of questions asked by MEPs, this 
paper follows a theoretical framework developed by the author elsewhere17 and identifies four types 
of possible requests that can be made — namely for 1) information (policy and procedural transpar-
ency), 2) justification of decisions or conduct, 3) change of decisions or conduct, and 4) sanctions 
17. Adina Maricut-Akbik, Accountability as Contestation – An Interactionist Approach to the Study of Public Accountability, Paper 
prepared for the 2018 Annual Conference of the European Group for Public Administration (EGPA), Lausanne, 5–7 September 2018. 
FigUre 1 ▪ Political affiliation of mePs sending letters 
with questions to ecb banking Supervision.
Most letters are single-authored, but 24 letters have 
multiple authors from the same political group. MEPs 
from S&D and ALDE tend to send letters in large 
groups: e.g. 30 MEPs from S&D sent 10 letters, while 
20 MEPs from the ALDE sent 5 letters. 
FigUre 2 ▪ Political affiliation of mePs taking the floor 
during public hearings of the chair of the Supervisory 
board.
What is counted is the number of instances when an 
MEP took the floor, not the number of questions asked 
at a time.
FigUre 3 ▪ Nationality of mePs sending letters with ques-
tions to ecb banking Supervision.
24 letters have multiple authors from MEPs of differ-
ent nationalities. What is shown here is the overall 
number of MEPs identified. 
FigUre 4 ▪ Nationality of mePs taking the floor during 
public hearings of the chair of the Supervisory board.
What is counted is the number of instances when an 
MEP took the floor, not the number of questions asked 
at a time.
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of responsible actors. Simultaneously, the paper distinguishes ‘initial questions’ (asked for the first 
time) from ‘follow-up questions’ that are raised because MEPs were dissatisfied with the original an-
swer or wanted more details about the issue under discussion. Box 4 (Figure 5) offers an overview 
of the different categories of questions identified in both public hearings and letters.
There is a fifth category of questions that diverges from the typology of accountability interac-
tions. This refers to ‘requests for policy views’ — present in 111 out of the 706 total questions. 
Such requests typically include demands for the ECB’s expert opinion on ongoing legislative 
files or on issues relevant to Member States domestically. While it makes sense for MEPs to 
consult the ECB on their legislative activity, this can be done separately and not filed under 
accountability. In fact, the ECB is formally consulted on proposed legislation that falls under 
the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) more generally.18 Requests for policy views 
cannot be considered a form of accountability because they do not concern the past activity 
of the ECB in terms of decisions or conduct. Conversely, they typically refer to the future legal 
framework of the Banking Union. Requests for policy views are more common during hearings 
(22% of all questions asked) than in letters (8.9% of all questions sent), with the additional 
observation that rapporteurs on legislative files are most likely to use hearings with the Chair 
of the Supervisory Board to ask for her expertise on issues that interest them. From this per-
spective, it appears that a fifth of the time of all hearings is wasted on questions that have 
nothing to do with accountability.
According to one ECB official, these questions are not in fact wasted because the ECB can 
‘provide important advice on financial legislation and it is in the interest of both EP and the 
ECB to exchange frequently also on such policy issues, even if this is not strictly speaking a 
discharge of accountability.’19 
box 4 ▪ what types of questions do mePs ask ecb banking Supervision? 
18. European Central Bank, All ECB Opinions (n.d.), accessed 29 August 2018. 
19. Comments by an ECB official on a presentation of an earlier draft of this paper at a closed workshop on 8 October 2018 at the 
Hertie School of Governance, panel 1 Accountability without contestation? The ECB and the EP in Banking Supervision (see also n 13). 
FigUre 5 ▪ Types of questions raised by mePs to ecb banking 
Supervision, in numbers (october 2013-april 2018).
FigUre 6 ▪ Topic of questions asked by mePs to ecb 
banking Supervision (october 2013-april 2018). 
Some questions can have multiple topics: for 
example, questions about ‘resolution/likely-to-fail 
decisions’ or ‘NPLs/manage capital shortfalls’ 
typically also have the code ‘specific banks.’ There 
are, however, some questions that have mutually 
exclusive topics. Most significantly for the find-
ings discussed in this paper, the code ‘specific 
banks’ never co-occurs with ‘SSM internal organi-
sation’ or ‘legislative/policy proposals.’
MEPS SPEND A LOT Of 
TIME ASKING fOR ECB 
OPINIONS ON LEGISLA-
TIVE PROPOSALS“
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Furthermore, the most prevalent types of questions in both letters and hearings are requests 
for information (49.7% overall) and justification of conduct (36.3% overall). This is not surpris-
ing, given the institutional independence of the ECB and the lack of political mechanisms to 
demand changes of decisions or impose sanctions (see section II). Given that the SSM was 
only established in 2013-2014, many questions addressed the internal organisation of ECB 
Banking Supervision and the 2014 comprehensive assessment. More interesting, however, is 
that the most popular subject of questions by far refers to the situation at specific banks under 
the direct or indirect supervision of the ECB (Box 4, Figure 6). 
Banks that attract the most attention are usually those that performed poorly in stress tests 
and had a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs), such as the Italian banks Monte dei Pas-
chi di Siena, Banco Populare de Vicenza, and Veneto Banca. Other examples include banks that 
were formally declared failing or likely to fail (e.g. the Spanish Banco Popular) or alternatively 
were considered to receive preferential treatment in stress tests (e.g. the German Deutsche 
Bank). MEPs also ask many questions about the resolution of less significant institutions (e.g. 
the Portuguese bank Banif) or the recapitalisation of state-owned significant banks with the 
approval of the Commission (e.g. the Portuguese bank Caixa Geral de Depósitos). Unsurpris-
ingly, these are also the banks that are most often mentioned in press reports regarding the 
performance of the SSM. 
However, given the professional secrecy requirements laid down in the Interinstitutional Agree-
ment between the EP and the ECB and in the Capital Requirements Directive IV, the ECB ‘can-
not comment on the interactions with individual supervised institutions or on the supervisory 
measures taken with regard to them.’20 There is thus a tension between the issue that MEPs 
care most about — the next one is ‘SSM internal organisation’ (see Box 4, Figure 6) — and the 
likelihood that they will receive the information they publicly seek. Contesting supervisory 
decisions is bound to be limited from the outset.
Moreover, follow-up questions are more likely to occur in hearings (65.3% of all questions) 
than in letters (41% of all questions raised). This is to be expected because some hearings 
have a central topic that dominates the Q&A session. Hearings with ‘heated’ debates took 
place, for example, in November 2016 on the methodology of stress tests and the alleged 
preferential treatment of Deutsche Bank thereof, in June 2017 on the recent ECB decision 
to declare Banco Popular failing or likely to fail (FOLTF), and in November 2017 when MEPs 
contested the draft Addendum to the ECB Guidance on NPLs as overstepping the institu-
tion’s mandate (see below). 
The Deutsche Bank case received a lot of attention in written letters as well. In short, the prob-
lem was that in the 2016 stress test, the ECB accepted in the assessment of Deutsche Bank 
the sale of its stake in the Chinese bank Hua Xia, despite the fact that the transaction was go-
ing to be completed at the end of the year and the stress test took place in the summer. There 
were nine letters asking the ECB for the reasoning behind its agreement to ‘bend the rules’ for 
the Deutsche Bank. The questions share common ground, as MEPs reference or copy text 
directly from a Financial Times article reporting the ECB’s preferential treatment in this case.21 
The Chair of the Supervisory Board defended the decision, explaining that the conclusion of the 
20. Danièle Nouy, Letter from Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board, to Mr José Manuel fernandes, MEP, with Respect to a 
Credit Institution under ECB Supervision, accessed 29 August 2018. 
21. Laura Noonan, Caroline Binham and James Shotter, Deutsche Bank Received Special Treatment in EU Stress Tests, financial Times 
(10 October 2016), accessed 7 June 2018. 
THE SITUATION AT  
SPECIfIC BANKS OfTEN 
ATTRACTS THE  
ATTENTION Of MEPS“
11 / 17
transaction was regarded as a mere formality (it was concluded by the end of the year). In ad-
dition, Deutsche Bank formally requested the exception; by comparison, other banks — which 
some MEPs claimed to have been in a similar position — did not request such an exception. The 
text of the ECB response to the nine letters is almost identical, with large portions of the reply 
copy-pasted from the first answer offered. Judging from the follow-up contestation in the No-
vember 2016 hearing, many MEPs did not accept the ECB’s answers as valid. The point here 
is that MEPs are eager to contest ECB supervisory decisions but there are only a few cases 
in which they have the background information and knowledge to do so.
The case of the 2017 draft Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on NPLs (‘the Adden-
dum’) also deserves further attention — not least because it was the subject of a letter sent 
by the EP President to the ECB. This is also the main clear-cut example of MEPs demanding 
concrete changes to the ECB’s conduct. The Addendum aimed to address one of the most 
persistent but also controversial problems in banking supervision, namely how banks should 
deal with high levels of NPLs on their balance sheets. The document was designed to supple-
ment the earlier ECB Guidance on the matter by specifying minimum levels of prudential provi-
sions for new NPLs starting 1 January 2018.22 Several Members of the ECON Committee, after 
asking the opinion of its Legal Service, contested some of these supervisory expectations 
as ultra vires because they effectively introduced additional obligations for banks beyond the 
current regulatory framework.23 At the same time, MEPs considered that the ECB did not give 
legislators and the public sufficient time to provide feedback on the Addendum, as its date of 
entry into force was less than three months from the publication of the draft version. Ms Nouy 
acknowledged during the hearing that the phrasing of several provisions could be improved, as 
the meaning seems to have been misunderstood from what the ECB had intended. One exam-
ple is the so-called ‘comply or explain mechanism,’ criticised for inverting the burden of proof 
from the supervisor to the supervised bank — meaning that banks would become responsible 
for showing that their provisioning level was adequate instead of the supervisor demonstrat-
ing that it was inadequate. This was changed in the revised version of the Addendum, whose 
date of entry into force was also postponed to 1 April 2018.24 The case is an example of the 
effective performance of the EP as an accountability forum when there is a clear, coordi-
nated agenda about what to ask from ECB Banking Supervision. The pressure put by MEPs 
asking questions on the same issue, even if sometimes they were repeated, is something to 
bear in mind for improving future hearings of the ECON Committee.
4 ▪ wHaT kiNd oF aNSwerS doeS 
ecb baNkiNg SUPerviSioN Provide? 
Moving to the way in which the ECB replies to MEPs (Box 5), we can immediately observe 
that the ECB tends to address questions head-on, substantively answering over 70% of 
all requests (Figure 7). These include the large number of questions asking for policy views, 
which the ECB typically provides (on 111 occasions). More interesting are the 413 answers 
22. European Central Bank, Press Release: ECB Reinforces Its NPL Guidance for Banks (ECB Banking Supervision, 4 October 2017), 
accessed 29 August 2018. 
23. See the opening remarks of Roberto Gualtieri, ECON Chair, at the hearing on 9 November 2017 (n 12). 
24. European Central Bank, Comparison of Pre- and Post-Consultation Versions of the Addendum 7, accessed 29 August 2018. 
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classified as ‘addressing questions’ in both letters and hearings. A question is considered ad-
dressed when the ECB directly engages with the request made by MEPs. Out of the 413 replies 
identified as such (Figure 8), the ECB provided justification for its decisions/conduct in 152 
answers, offered full information about decisions in 96 answers (policy transparency) and 
gave full information about decision-making processes 46 times (procedural transparency). 
Questions requesting information were partially answered on 47 occasions. Furthermore, the 
ECB defended its decisions without changing them in 36 answers, and promised to change its 
conduct in 23 others. In terms of sanctions, these were no longer necessary in three instances 
(because the responsible parties had already resigned), while on one occasion the ECB reject-
ed the need for sanctions.
box 5 ▪ How does ecb banking Supervision respond to questions from mePs? 
What are the questions that go unanswered? (Figure 7). One the one hand, there are those for 
which the ECB invokes ‘lack of competence’ because they are outside its mandate in banking 
supervision or because they concern issues within the purview of NCAs (84 in total). Such 
questions include 1) the methodology of stress tests, especially the choice of adverse scenar-
ios, for which the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) are responsible; 2) the resolution process of specific banks, where the Single Resolu-
tion Board (SRB) and/or the European Commission have competence; 3) issues of consum-
er protection — especially concerning unfair practices of banks  —  where national bodies have 
jurisdiction; and 4) cases of financial misconduct and money laundering in different member 
states, where national authorities are also the competent institutions.
These instances are the result of the intricate multi-level framework of the Banking Union, 
where the division of tasks is spread across many institutions at different levels of govern-
ance. Separating bank regulation (EBA) from bank supervision (ECB) from bank resolution (the 
SRB, the Commission) created overlapping areas of activity that are difficult to disentangle 
from an accountability perspective. At the same time, the fact that the SSM mandate is limited 
to prudential supervision and hence does not include matters such as consumer protection or 
money laundering additionally complicated matters because it restricts the range of issues for 
which the ECB can be held accountable. It is difficult to establish whether MEPs ask ques-
FigUre 7 ▪ Types of answers provided by ecb banking 
Supervision to mePs, in numbers (october 2013–april 2018).
FigUre 8 ▪ what does it mean to ‘address a question’?
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tions outside the ECB’s supervisory competence unknowingly or on purpose  —  because 
they are important to their constituencies. As a general pattern, it seems that many MEPs 
base their questions on current financial news in the national or international media, which 
suggests an interest in politically salient issues that is disconnected from considerations of 
the relevant competent authority.
Nonetheless, not all cases are straightforward when it comes to the ECB’s lack of com-
petence. For instance, in the first report on the functioning of the SSM, the Commission 
discretely criticised the ECB for pointing the finger at the EBA regarding the flaws of stress 
test methodologies, keeping in mind its own responsibility for the quality of the process.25 
Another relevant example concerns the Portuguese bank Banif, a less significant institution 
under the supervision of Banco de Portugal, which was put into resolution in December 
2015. The controversy concerned the ECB’s approval to limit Banif’s access to Eurosystem 
liquidity prior to the announced decision that the bank was failing or likely to fail (FOLTF), as 
well as the involvement therein of ECB Vice-President Vítor Constâncio, who was the former 
Governor of Banco de Portugal. In the following year, Portuguese MEP Nuno Melo (EPP) sent 
12 letters to the ECB demanding information and justification of conduct about the ECB’s 
role prior to and during the FOLTF decision-making process.26 On the supervisory part, the 
SSM Chair repeatedly invoked lack of competence and directed the MEP towards Banco 
de Portugal as the ‘right addressee’ for the questions.27 The point here is that the Banking 
Union established a convoluted system: it is not always clear who bears responsibility for 
specific actions or how to differentiate ‘real’ lack of competence from passing the buck 
from one institution to another.
On the other hand, questions that do not get appropriate answers are those in which the ECB 
refuses to respond to issues raised by MEPs. Here there is a difference between oral and writ-
ten questions, as the lack of answers in letters is supported by confidentiality requirements 
of the SSM legal framework, while no reply in hearings is an example of evading answers by 
not addressing the substantive point of the question raised. However, for the latter it is difficult 
to identify ill-intent; most often the Chair of the Supervisory Board simply spends more time 
covering one question and does not have time for the others. 
The lack of [full] answers on confidentiality grounds deserves closer attention, as they are 
present in 13.3% of ECB letters. All these answers concern questions that require information 
or justification of decisions regarding a specific supervised bank. In the early years, the ECB 
would address such requests by invoking its confidentiality regime and offering no answer. 
Over time, the SSM Chair started to provide general considerations about the bank in ques-
tion and what the ECB does to address similar circumstances for any supervised bank. This 
allowed an answer to be provided without revealing what is considered sensitive supervisory 
decisions on specific banks. When confronted by an MEP with contestation of the entire se-
crecy regime, the Chair of the Supervisory Board answered as follows:
25. European Commission, Commission Staff working Document Accompanying the Document ’Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism Established Pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
{COM(2017) 591 final} 52. 
26. European Parliament, Nuno Melo Parliamentary Activities – questions to the ECB (European Parliament – Public Register of 
Documents, 2016) accessed 23 October 2018. 
27. Letter from Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board, to Mr Melo, MEP, regarding a Less Significant Credit Institution  
(ECB Banking Supervision, 3 March 2016), accessed 23 October 2018. 
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These [confidentiality] requirements, as adopted by the European EP and/or the Council of the 
European Union, form the cornerstone of the legal supervisory framework under which European 
banking supervision operates. They are aimed at instilling confidence in credit institutions that 
the banking supervisor will treat their sensitive information appropriately. This is essential for 
an open supervisory dialogue and thus an important basis for effective banking supervision.28 
Invoking confidentiality requirements means that questions of MEPs are dealt with expe-
diently and unsatisfactorily from the perspective of an accountability forum. While some 
MEPs ask multiple rounds of questions about the same bank, they give up at some point and 
move on to different issues — aware that there is nothing they can legally do to force the ECB 
to provide public information or justification.
On this matter, an ECB official explained that ‘what is observable by the public is the non-confi-
dential part. But there are a number of possibilities to exchange [information] on a confidential 
basis,’ such as the routine in-camera meetings before hearings of the Chair of the Superviso-
ry Board or the [as-yet-unused] formal confidential oral discussions and inquiry committees. 
Moreover, from the perspective of the ECB, such questions remain important even if they can-
not reply with bank-specific information: ‘On the one hand, it helps us understand the thinking 
of MEPs and on the other hand it may allow us to clarify our general policies which are of 
relevance to the specific case.’29 
Ultimately, the problem of the ECB’s secrecy regime can be solved in one of two ways: either 
the two institutions agree on a change in the legal framework that would allow the EP to re-
ceive answers to politically salient questions, or MEPs have to alter the type of questions they 
send to ECB Banking Supervision. Information about specific banks is at the heart of banking 
supervision because it concerns the way in which SSM rules are enforced;30 for this reason, it 
can be expected that the EP will continue to ask such questions in the future even if they will 
rarely receive full answers in response. 
coNclUSioN & Policy recommeNdaTioNS
The first years of the functioning of the SSM institutionalised the accountability relationship 
between the EP and ECB Banking Supervision. As noted in ECB Annual Reports on the SSM, 
the two institutions interact on a regular basis through hearings and letters. MEPs ask the 
Supervisory Board numerous oral and written questions, to which the ECB replies in a timely 
manner. MEPs from Portugal, Germany, Italy, Spain, and France ask the bulk of questions, 
while [smaller] political groups on the left tend to be more active. 
But frequent interactions are insufficient to determine the nature of the accountability re-
lationship at play. Too often, MEPs ask questions about issues that are outside the ECB’s 
supervisory competence or that simply do not contest anything about the ECB’s decisions 
or conduct in the SSM. While public hearings became more focused over time in terms of 
28. Danièle Nouy, Letter from Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board, to Mr Hayes, MEP, Regarding Professional Secrecy  
Requirements, accessed 26 October 2017. 
29. See n 19. 
30. Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg, Does Banking Union Worsen the EU’s Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater  
Supervisory Data Transparency (2015) 53 Journal of Common Market Studies 769, 770. 
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topic, they are still undermined by a format which allows too many uncoordinated speakers 
to take the floor and ask not entirely relevant questions. To be an effective political account-
ability forum, the ECON Committee needs not only more instances of contestation but also 
more confrontational accountability interactions in public with the Chair of the Supervisory 
Board — similar to testimonies of the Governor of the Bank of England before the Treasury 
Committee of the House of Commons31 or to the hearings of Federal Reserve officials before 
the United States Congress.32 As with other specialised executive bodies of the EU, there is 
an obvious imbalance between the expertise of the EP and that of the institution they are sup-
posed to hold accountable. The EP’s Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) has helped 
with the problem of asymmetric information by preparing background notes before every 
public hearing of the Chair of the Supervisory Board. In-house expertise should be further 
expanded in order to provide MEPs with a pool of concrete questions about ongoing develop-
ments in the SSM (Box 6 below).
As for ECB Banking Supervision, the first years of the functioning of the SSM showed an 
openness to engage with questions that concern organisation and general decision-mak-
ing procedures. But the ECB is a creature of rules, which means that any unanswered 
question is explained away by the system of rules in place. In accountability studies, this 
problem is well-known; Roy L. Heidelberg explained how the reliance on rules can allow 
an institution to ‘dismiss criticism of a policy or action by appealing to an obedience to 
procedural rules or, at worst, to justify doing the wrong thing in the right way.’33 This is not 
to say that the ECB secrecy regime in banking supervision is completely unjustified or 
should simply be abolished, but the lack of answers on confidentiality grounds remains 
questionable. Unanswered questions signal that there is something to hide from the pub-
lic because of wrongdoing rather than due to ‘financial stability’, ‘professional trust’, or ‘fair 
market competition’.
The underlying accountability shortcoming is the inability to assess the performance of ECB 
Banking Supervision in the absence of information about the specific decisions taken. This 
problem could be solved by shifting the focus from the content of individual supervisory deci-
sions to the overall performance of the ECB as a bank supervisor. Other authors34 have already 
noted the lack of a clear yardstick against which to measure whether the ECB is achieving its 
SSM mandate to ensure financial stability and ‘the safety and soundness of credit institutions.’ 
What seems more feasible is the publication of benchmarks and statistical information to 
judge their effectiveness. In other words, if the ECB is doing a good job in banking supervi-
sion, how would MEPs — and the public at large — know it? One way of doing this could be to 
develop benchmarks corresponding to the three goals of the ECB in banking supervision (see 
Box 6). Such indicators need not be quantifiable or fixed in time; on the contrary, ongoing de-
velopments in banking supervision should lead to a periodic revision of the benchmarks. The 
existence of clear indicators would allow MEPs to address the performance of the ECB as a 
whole rather than prioritise the situation at specific banks as reported in the media.
31. House of Commons Treasury Committee, Accountability of the Bank of England. Twenty-first Report of Session 2010–12 (2011) HC 874, 
accessed 6 April 2018. 
32. federal Reserve, The Fed - Testimony of Federal Reserve Officials (n.d.), accessed 28 September 2018. 
33. Roy L Heidelberg, Political Accountability and Spaces of Contestation (2017) 49 Administration & Society 1379, 1386. 
34. fabian Amtenbrink and Menelaos Markakis, Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue in the Euro Area? A Study of 
the Interaction between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism [2017] ADEMU 
working Paper Series 5–6, accessed 4 June 2018; see also Benjamin Braun, Two Sides of the Same Coin? Independence and Account-
ability at the ECB (Transparency International EU 2017) 7, accessed 11 January 2018. 
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In the future, ECB Banking Supervision will be considered accountable to the EP because of 
the way in which the next Chairs of the Supervisory Board will substantively answer questions 
from MEPs. While the ECB is not expected to indiscriminately comply with requests from the 
EP, it should stand ready to explain and defend its conduct in the SSM. After all, accountability 
and democratic legitimacy go hand in hand: an accountable bank supervisor is a legitimate 
bank supervisor. The latter is desirable for both EU institutions and the general public.
box 6 ▪ Policy recommendations 
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANk
•  Change the format of public hearings to 
streamline the Q&A session:
·  Centralise questions, ensure there is no 
overlap, address specific topics in order, 
one question at a time;
·  Coordinate a division of labour within 
political groups (different MEPs take the 
lead in different accountability hearings); 
·  Task the EGOV Unit with providing a 
monthly round-up of possible questions to 
ECB Banking Supervision;
·  Separate accountability hearings from 
dialogues on legislative files.
•  Focus written and oral questions on the 
mandate of the ECB in the SSM;
•  Organise accountability hearings on the 
performance of the ECB as a bank supervisor 
on different dimensions; 
•  Communications: 
·  Publish transcripts of public hearings of 
the Chair of the Supervisory Board, similar 
to the Monetary Dialogues.
•  Annual Report: provide more detailed 
information about the subject of questions  
raised by MEPs and how the ECB answers 
them;
•  Develop public benchmarks for assessing the 
extent to which the ECB reaches its objectives 
in the SSM:
·  Benchmarks should correspond to the 
three SSM goals (ensure the safety and 
soundness of the European banking system; 
increase financial integration and stability  
in Europe, ensure consistent supervision);
·  Benchmarks should be tangible, but not 
necessarily quantifiable or fixed in time;
·  Link the regular release of statistical 
information to the benchmarks.
•  Communications:
·  Publicise explainer videos/sheets of 
the type ‘whom should I ask?’ to clarify 
the division of competences in the 
Banking Union between the ECB, EBA, 
the ESRB, the Commission, and NCAs. 
TO BOTH
•  In the medium- to long-term, reappraise the secrecy regime in banking supervision in order 
to identify specific circumstances under which supervisory decisions can be disclosed
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